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Abstract: 
 
 
A crucial question at the center of corporate governance theories and of the literature on social networks alike is 
the sense of empower of prestige, or influence on the actors of a social network. This paper approaches the 
possibility of measuring this influence by detecting key individuals who support network dynamics. By means of 
a study conducted on a sample of CAC 40 directors, it will be shown that the most influential elements are not 
necessarily the best placed at the beginning. Contrary to all expectations, a dynamics of influence is based on 
criteria of indispensability to the network that will be presented as an example. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent bankruptcy of the great flagships of American capitalism (Enron, Lehman 
Brothers, AIG), indeed the present financial crisis, cannot be considered as mere deviations, 
or accidents of history; they all question governance under all its guises. In a broader sense, 
these dysfunctions shed new light upon modes of governance, notably on the Anglo-Saxon 
model and its shareholder approach at the very moment when it seemed to have imposed its 
supremacy in Europe to the detriment of the stakeholder model (Cohen (2005), Peyrelevade 
(2005), Streeck and Höpner (2003)). If one is to consider corporate governance (CG) as a set 
of regulatory practices which govern the relations between directors (the management power) 
and company shareholders (those who own the capital), as well as other stakeholders of the 
company (employees, creditors, suppliers, clients) (Pastré 1994), it will be immediately 
apparent that there is no single CG model. This set of rules is in fact rooted in and evolves 
within traditions, within legal and institutional frameworks that vary from one country to 
another, from one geographical and cultural area to another (OECD 2004). Nevertheless, it is 
commonly admitted that a director would not be able to really fulfill his/her role beyond a 
certain number of directorships2. Thus, the AFG-ASFFI report on “corporate governance” 
(2012) advocates the limit of three directorships, whereas the French law on New Economic 
Regulations (NRE) authorizes up to 5 directorships.  
Nevertheless, this quantitative approach should not conceal the difficulty of choosing a 
director: should one prefer a director with only one directorship, who consequently has little 
influence, in the sense of traditional measures of influence within a network (as it will be 
shown, he would potentially be a weak link in the sense of Granovetter (1973)), or an 
influential director already holding a directorship elsewhere (potentially a strong link). This 
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  This limitation of directorships is placed within a broader political and historical context, unfavourable 
to the accumulation of directorships. 
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issue arises regardless of the qualitative nature of the director, whether he/she is declared to be 
independent or not3. In fact, the appointment of a director cannot simply be made at random. 
Behind this promoted candidate lies possible access to a network, to information/expertise, to 
mutual influences, which takes us back to the matter of the importance of maintaining a 
director or of his/her appointment for the influence of a particular director, a network of 
directors (a community) or even a company. The literature on partner selection is an important 
one, and many factors that affect partner selection have been identified. Most of them assume 
that the main motivation is to enforce some of the firm’s network characteristics: market 
uncertainty, alliance, learning of new practices, and the diffusion of new management strategy 
(see Burt (1993), Gulati (1995), Powel et al. (1996), Beckman et al. (2002, 2004) and 
Connelly et al. (2011)).   
This article seeks to explore the dynamics of network building in the specific case of the 
appointment to the boards of directors. Unless the appointment of a certain individual in the 
position of director of a particular company, part of a corporate network, can be reduced to a 
single motivation4, it would grant that person a quality of indispensability, a criterion which is 
yet to be detailed. Our essentially theoretical study seeks to define this indispensability 
criterion on the basis of a special motivation: that of strengthening the power of influence of 
the co-opting members, or of the business, within their respective networks. This is part of the 
literature on the analysis of business networks and, more specifically, of director interlocks. 
For Dudouet et al. (2009), the choice of a specific director aims to strengthen the national 
influence of the company, while from an international perspective, the choice of a director 
                                                 
3
  This is because nothing prevents a director holding several directorships to be declared independent 
within certain boards and non-independent within others.  
4
 A traditional approach, inspired by the works Bourdieu, is based on the assumption of the replication of an elite 
that shares a common denominator, be it cultural, educational (major schools), economic or simply based on 
“filiation” (Dudouet et al. (2007), Kramarz et al. (2006), Massol, et al. (2009b)). But motivations can be much 
more pragmatic, as it is emphasized by Mizruchi (2003): having been recruited by someone who could be a 
friend, can scarcely lead to asking difficult questions or result in confrontations.  
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aims to fill structural gaps5. In the French case, Pichard-Stanford (2000) examines how 
leaders leverage these relationships to acquire new directorships and thus gain access to 
sources of information allowing them to specialize in the management of the company while 
strengthening their specific capital. According to this author, business growth and, therefore, 
the compensation of managing staff, can hypothetically be related positively to the company’s 
capacity to exert influence: for instance, using a criterion of centrality degree (the number of 
links established between the company and the other companies via its directors holding 
several directorships); Hence the temptation to appoint directors with several directorships 
who already have a high degree of centrality within the board. We do not deny that such a 
strategy can exist (namely an objective to increase the level of influence of the company), but 
the individual interests of different board members remain to be analyzed. The assumption is 
that the more indispensable or desirable an individual, the more he/she enhances the influence 
of appointed directors within their respective networks (i.e. egocentric network), which can 
result in an increase in the income of the leader (Vigliano (2009), but also in a relaxation in 
his/her discipline (Charreaux 2003).  
Our research is divided into three sections. The first section provides a critical survey of the 
concepts of centrality and introduces the concept of Key Player. The second section discusses 
the dynamics of building a network around these notions of centrality and Key Player and the 
impact of this dynamics on the existence of communities within a network. Section 3 
empirically illustrates the need to develop a robust indispensability criterion using a CAC 40 
network of directors. This criterion measures the changes induced by the introduction of an 
individual or by his/her removal on the power-sharing within the network. Finally, we reach 
our conclusions. 
 
                                                 
5According to Vigliano (2009), structural holes provide “business opportunities” to position oneself as a “bridge” 
or middle-man and thus, would bring a competitive edge to those who have a bridge position.  
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1. Who is central to whom? 
 
Since the publication of Freeman’s article (1979), these notions of power or influence have 
traditionally been observed through the prism of the use of centrality measures such as 
betweenness or closeness. Betweenness measures the number of times a node is placed in the 
path between two other nodes that are not interrelated. An individual may be weakly 
connected to the others and yet prove to be an essential intermediary for exchanges, or else, a 
mandatory path. Obviously, a high degree of betweenness is synonymous with the ability to 
influence and/or coordinate the network. Closeness measures the ability to reach all the other 
nodes in the network via the shortest paths (i.e. geodetic distances). In other words, it 
indicates the possibility of accessing the source of information in the social network. Needless 
to say, this indicator cannot be calculated unless all nodes are interconnected (i.e. there is 
always a way to reach everyone). Although these measures are widely accepted, they are 
nevertheless subject of criticism. Undoubtedly, the main objection is that of Borgatti (2005): 
betweenness or closeness measures assume that information flows only pass through the 
shortest paths, and that these flows cannot be divided.  
The use of the shortest paths to transmit information, between two individuals for example, 
presupposes that the sender knows the entire network in advance, that is his/her network, but 
also the network of his/her direct friends, then the network of the networks of his/her friends, 
etc. However, in the absence of such information, the small-world effect tells a different story. 
The sender will choose the person whose network has the highest probability to connect 
indirectly to the recipient. Then, how does one choose the best person? Assuming that each 
sender knows their network perfectly and therefore implicitly knows if the members of the 
network have a network close to him/her or not, Granovetter (1973) has demonstrated that 
they often needed to focus on weak links. If one assumes that the strength of the relationship 
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between two individuals is proportional to the equivalence of their relationship, that is, to the 
“structural equivalence” (Lorraine and White (1971) and Burt (1976)), the search of the weak 
link will favor the choice of a person whose network is sufficiently different from his/her own 
in the hope that this person has an acquaintance who has an acquaintance, etc., who is in a 
better position to share the information. In the next section, it will be shown that to challenge 
the assumption of perfect and, above all, complete information amounts to questioning the 
very dynamics of networking.  As far as the division of flows is concerned and in the context 
of influence, a person may be interested in increasing the number of transmission channels for 
the same information (i.e. this is the buzz strategy). Or else, the betweenness measure6 does 
not allow an increased number of paths. In fact, this measure is defined by: 
 ≠≠∈∀∈ ≠
≠
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The calculation of this measure for network nodes B and C, described in Figure 1, gives
2
1)()( == CbetBbet . Taking the B node as reference node, B is found to be a mandatory 
path only between A and D. However, C is also a possibility of linking A and D. So the 
intermediacy value is 1/2 because it implicitly assigns a 50% probability that the information 
passes through B rather than C between A and B7. 
 
Figure 1 – B and C mandatory paths between A and D 
                                                 
6
 See Appendix A.3 for a definition.  
7
 Proportionally, we have bet(B)=1/6, with the rescaled formula (should we consider path AD and AD as 
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It is likely that if A wanted to influence D, he/she would seek to do so through B and C. Why 
deprive oneself of a means of influence? 
In reality, the choice of the optimal path to reach a particular director is complex. In fact, the 
link created by such a choice can only be temporary: the network of CAC 40 directors is 
constantly changing. Directors are generally appointed for only 4 or 5 years and each of them 
may terminate their mandate when they see fit. Furthermore, choosing one new director over 
another, can lead to two opposing strategies. A new director can strengthen the corporate 
network (providing resources, market knowledge, know-how) and thus improve the overall 
performance of the company. But the choice to integrate a new director can also stem from an 
opportunistic strategy employed to strengthen the staff egocentric network of prescribers, 
even at the expense of the company. Hence, we gather that the construction of a network, 
including that of an egocentric network, is generally not a coincidence.  
The traditional approach based on the graph theory analyses this kind of construction 
dynamics by means of the correct setting and use of a random network (Newman 2003). 
Because this approach does not allow a consideration of the “small-world” characteristics of 
social networks, a more recent, alternative approach was proposed by Jackson and Rogers 
(2007), one based on the use of tools from statistical physics. Even if this approach can track 
the small-world characteristics, it fails however to provide an endogenous understanding of 
the network’s dynamics. Deng, Heping and Dejun (2007) studied the impact of the removal of 
a link within the dynamics of building a network as defined by Barabási and Albert (1999). 
They show that certain structural properties such as the small-world effect may be modified 
by the removal of an individual. There are thus people who are essential to the network and 
others that are not, in the sense of the existence of a small-world effect. But the matter of 
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identifying these indispensable individuals remains without a satisfactory (or complete) 
solution. 
Borgatti (2003, 2006) suggested an alternative to the use of too simple measures of 
betweenness and closeness to identify such individuals. This alternative relies on the 
definition of a Key Player. Two readings of the Key Player Problem are possible:  
a) The “Key Player Problem Positive” (KPP-Pos), which means to select a subnet for the 
rapid dissemination of information/practice throughout the network.  
b) The “Key Player Problem Negative” (KPP-Neg), which determines the essential subnet 
to the functioning of the system. It is self-evident that if this subnet is removed, the network 
loses its fundamental properties. 
Within a social network, and in order to optimize its individual network, these KPP-Pos and 
KPP-Neg notions are directly related to the research of a key individual: adding this 
individual means reaching new people quickly (KPP-Pos) and their removal destabilizes the 
network (KPP-Neg). 
 
2. Network Dynamics 
 
2.1. Adding Friends and KPP-Pos 
The notion of KPP-Pos questions the choice of the individual to add to one’s network. We 
know, using the shortest paths requires a perfect knowledge of the network. If such 
knowledge is not available, how could someone find such path? By groping around, through a 
process of trial and error? If we accept the impossibility of knowing the network to perfection, 
notably from an egocentric point of view, then the preferred choice of individuals to form or, 
especially, to reconstruct one’s network is problematic. It can be easily admitted that an 
individual knows his/her closest friends/acquaintances (to one link) and even friends of 
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friends (two links). Whenever an individual is brought into one’s inner circle of 
friends/acquaintances (one link), this friend’s network gets to be known too. Based on 
Borgatti (2003,2006), the figure 2  below illustrates this problem. If A can integrate E or F 
into his network, depending on his purpose he will have to prioritize the individual F, if he 
seeks to increase the size of his indirect network, and, the individual E, assuming that he is a 
friend, if he seeks to strengthen his influence on B, C and D.  
 
Figure 2 - Adding a link starting with A: E or F 
The quest for an important individual within the meaning of the KPP-Pos can be operated by 
the notion of “structural equivalence” (Lorraine and White (1971) and Burt (1976)): two 
individuals are structurally equivalent if they have the same relations (overlapping 
neighborhoods). The pair of individuals {A, F} will be preferred to the pair {A, E} if it is less 
structurally equivalent. Indeed, if A and E are central, particularly with regard to the closeness 
centrality8, but have exactly the same neighborhoods/relationships, then linking A individuals 
to an F individual will render the whole more efficient (particularly in terms of number of 
nodes connected to A’s network). 
 
2.2. Deleting Friends and KPP-Neg 
                                                 
8
 This indicator measures the ability of joining all of the other nodes of the network using the shortest paths (i.e. 
geodetic distances).  
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A social network of the directors of large companies type is by definition constantly evolving. 
One director is appointed, another one is let go. If the networks of these two directors are not 
structurally equivalent, then these changes can have a significant impact on the structural 
properties of the network as a whole and/or the network efficiency of a particular director. The 
KPP-Neg notion is directly related to the structural impact of a dismissal.  
According to Borgatti (2006), the measure that one would naturally think of for studying the 
KPP-Neg would be that of Freeman’s betweenness centrality (1979) which measure the 
number of times a node is positioned in the path between two other nodes that are not 
interrelated. An individual may be weakly connected to the others and yet prove to be an 
indispensable intermediary during the exchanges. In theory, a high degree of betweenness is 
synonymous with the ability to influence and/or coordinate the network.  
As previously stated, the notion of KPP-Neg indicates who is important in relation to a given 
network characteristic. However, as Borgatti (2006) demonstrates, this characteristic can only 
be slightly affected by the disappearance of a central individual in the sense of betweenness. 
Consider the network describes below. 
 
Figure 3 - Example of a network wherein the deletion of a central node (1) is not a 
source of discontinuity (Source: Borgatti 2006) 
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Within this network, according to different traditional measures of centrality, node 1 appears 
to be each time as the most central. Or, if the important notion is that of network cohesion in 
the sense of continuity (and not fragmentation), then removing node 1 is inconsequential, 
whereas removing node 8, which is situated on a lower centrality level, regardless of what the 
measure of centrality is, would trigger a genuine discontinuity.  
Thus, measuring the effectiveness of a network implies a clearly defined criterion of 
underlying efficiency. However, efficiency can be a network’s outer, a priori aspect, such as 
the network’s ability to generate pricing agreements. Highlighting the “efficiency-structure” 
correlation raises empirical difficulties. Thus, traditionally, we aim to test whether a more 
connected network has an impact on the distribution of dividends, on the income of 
executives, and on the performance of the company (Pichard-Stanford (2000), Vigliano 
(2009)). Naturally, it follows that an individual is essential if effective, and, if the contrary, he 
is useless. But does one need to be influential in the sense of a classification and according to 
a given network criterion in order to be indispensable? 
 
2.3. Communities, Weak Links and Egocentric Networks 
The network described in Figure 3 clearly shows two communities. As it was pinpointed by 
Pons (2005) and Pons and Latapy (2006), the concept of community within graph theory is 
not clearly defined. However, it is possible to define a community as a set of vertices whose 
density of internal connections is greater than the density of connections to the outside (Pons, 
2005). Assuming a network whose number of communities decreases is a more cohesive 
network, we can therefore define an individual “indispensable” to the network as an 
individual for whom: 
- the disappearance of links within the network increases the number of communities; 
- conversely, his/her presence in the network reduces the number of communities. 
12 
 
The first definition refers to a KPP-Neg type of reading, the second to a KPP-Pos one. In 
Figure 3, node 8 is essential; without it, the community formed of nodes {9;10;11;12} is 
isolated from the rest of the network9. Or, as previously stated, node 8 is not the most central, 
and therefore, according to this criterion, the most influential. Furthermore, it seems 
legitimate to redefine the {9, 10, 11, 12} community as 8’s community. This brings us to an 
egocentric reading of the network. But the KPP notions use a global reading of the network. 
This becomes a matter of reconsidering these concepts from an egocentric perspective. Within 
a closed social network, where admission is made by appointment, for instance, it is not 
uncommon for someone’s inclusion to only be the result of someone else’s choice. The latter 
can include the candidate for a macro reason or for a micro reason. The macro reason  is 
based on the assumption that the candidate will benefit the whole network or the entire 
community. When defining an efficiency criterion, the notion of KPP-Neg shows its 
relevance. More selfish, the micro reason postulates only that a candidate will strengthen a 
feature of the sponsor’s network/community. It is the sponsor’s opportunism against the 
potential efficiency of the network.  
An individual may seek to strengthen his weak links while ignoring whether this will or will 
not improve the cohesion of the entire network. In fact, within an egocentric network there is 
a possible relationship between the concepts of KPP and that of Granovetter’s (1973) strength 
of weak links. The impact of these weak links on the communities they originated in or on 
any other term of comparison has yet to be seen/discovered or identified. Based on the 
criterion of betweenness centrality and on a criterion of network cohesion measured using the 
number and size of communities, the following section of the paper will emphasize the 
distinction between influential and indispensable within a network of directors. 
 
                                                 
9
 Node 8 can also be interpreted as a cut-point (i.e. node of an initial component without which this component 
would break into several elements).  
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3. Empirical Analyses and Robustness within CAC 40 
 
From all the mechanisms of corporate governance that aim to “delineate the powers and 
influence the decisions of leaders” of large managerial companies (Charreaux, 1997), the 
Board of Directors (BOD) occupies a central place, regardless of the outlook adopted. Within 
the disciplinary or financial approach of corporate governance, the Board is primarily 
designed as the main instrument for monitoring managers so that they maximize shareholder 
value. From this point of view, the directors are characterized by their independence in what 
concerns the management, their expertise, their ability to control and implement mechanisms 
that encourage managers to be effective and less opportunistic. Within the partnership 
approach, and even more so in the case of the strategic or cognitive approaches of governance 
(Charreaux 2000, Gomez 1996), there is an emphasis on the ability of the Board to participate 
in the creation of sustainable value by contributing, for example, to the choice of optimal 
strategies, helping management to identify and build new opportunities for development, or 
even by promoting innovation (Prahalad 1994). As well as the aforementioned oversight role 
of directors, there are other functions and skills, such as the ability to provide resources, that 
enrich the human capital, build relationships with other companies. It is the cognitive and 
interpersonal contribution of directors that is sought after, the objective being to increase the 
competitiveness of the company. 
Choosing a director is without doubt strategically important. According to Guieu and Meschi 
(2008), “between 2000 and 2003, there have been significant changes in the number and 
composition of network administrators in Europe. [...] many networks have disappeared; 
entirely new ones have been created. Subsequently, a big replacement of directors could be 
observed during this period: two thirds of directors belonging to a network in 2003 did not 
belong to a network in 2000. Out of the 95 that belonged to a network in 2000, only 45 are 
14 
 
still within a network three years later.” Thus, a company, a director or board of directors, 
needs to constantly consider the renewal of a mandate or the appointment of a new member.  
For the remainder of the analysis we contend that the appointment of an X individual must 
have the effect of increasing the Board’s efficiency or, from a more egocentric perspective, of 
strengthening the network of the individual Z, a current member of the Board. But that leaves 
us again with the delicate question of measuring the importance or indispensability of 
appointing X or getting Y to stay. To this end, we propose the use of a criterion of 
indispensability, closely related after all to the notions of KPP-Pos and KPP-Neg. The 
empirical application of our approach relies on a database which consists of the directors of 
CAC 40 companies in 200410. By definition, there is a link (within the Board) whenever two 
directors have the same BOD in common and there is a link (between Boards) between 
companies whenever a director holds multiple directorships. In our database, the average size 
of boards is of 14.205 directors and the average number of direct links between companies 
(through a director holding several directorships) is of 9.025. Similarly, out of the 429 
directors listed in the database, the average number of directorships is of 1.2913, with a 
maximum of 5 directorships and 349 with only one directorship (about 79.6% of directors). 
This creates an average number of 18.1305 direct links between directors. 
 
3.1. Foreword: What Makes a Good Criterion? 
We made reference to a certain critique of the criteria of centrality according to Freeman 
(1979). These criticisms belong to network analysis as a whole. By focusing on individual 
networks (egocentric), we can formulate criticism directly inspired from decision theory. By 
analogy to the row adjunction criterion used by Milnor (1954), a robust classification criterion 
should be such that the result of ranking 2 individuals would not have to be changed by 
                                                 
10The methodology of putting together the database is described in Appendix A.1.  
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adding an individual who ranks lower than the first 2 within the network. Or, centrality 
criteria are generally not robust.  Certainly, the measurement of the centrality degree is 
certainly too rough to fulfill this robustness condition. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate that 
the influence of directors is not homogeneous. Some have more influence than others. 
Therefore, within a network of CAC 40 directors, there is in fact no causal link between the 
size of boards (i.e. the number of directors) and the ability of the company to create links with 
other companies (see Figure A.1., Appendix A). 
An analysis based on the criterion of betweenness centrality (see Appendix A.3), demonstrates 
that the disappearance of F. Riboud’s links brings great “benefits” to Marc Ladreit de 
Lacharrière and, to a lesser degree, to Thierry Breton, whereas it “harms” the positions of 
Lindsay Owen-Jones and Didier Lombard.  
 
Proposition 1: The individuals indispensable to the network are not the same for all. 
 
Proposition 1 is obvious. If keeping director F. Riboud proves to be indispensable to keeping 
the dominant position of Lindsay Owen-Jones (in the sense of a KPP-Neg criterion where 
efficiency is the ranking according to betweenness), his eviction (or his non-inclusion) 
appears as indispensable to Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière. Depending on the point of view 
adopted, we note here a contradiction.  
How can this result be interpreted? Remember that this betweenness centrality somewhat 
measures the likelihood of a director or a company to be on a geodetic path (i.e. the smallest 
of path lengths connecting two nodes within a network) of different directors or companies of 
the network and therefore to be a mandatory path for connecting two directors or companies. 
The dismissal of F. Riboud will force some directors who used to pass by him, to turn towards 
16 
 
other directors (Marc Ladreit de Lacharrière) and indirectly not to go through to a close 
connection of F. Riboud’s any longer (Lindsay Owen-Jones).  
Noting that there are changes in the relative rankings of a centrality criterion, such as that of 
betweenness, following the inclusion or dismissal of the links of a given director, we propose 
to define the notion of indispensability. 
 
3.2. Where Are the Strong Weak Links? 
 If we delete F. Riboud’s links (initially 20th in terms of betweenness), Lindsay Owen-Jones 
drops one place. Let us assume that deleting the links of director who ranked 400th (from 429) 
led to the same result. Can we give the same power of influence or indispensability to these 
two directors within Lindsay Owen-Jones’s network?  
Clearly, influential individuals are more likely to change relative rankings than individuals 
with little influence. But if this were not the case, can we deduce that these individuals are 
indispensable weak links? Weak because they have little influence according to the centrality 
criterion applied, but indispensable to a given director because they are a means of deeply 
changing his influence. Thus, if we take Lindsay Owen-Jones as a reference point, who is the 
most central in terms of betweenness and if we eliminate Edouard de Royère’s links (initially 
6th) Lindsay Owen-Jones drops 4 places. Similarly, without René Carron (initially 11th) he 
drops 3 places. There are many directors who, despite having little or no influence in the 
sense of the betweenness criterion, make Lindsay Owen-Jones drop 2 places if their links are 
deleted from the network. Nevertheless, at a dynamic reading, their deletion could be easily 
replaced by the appearance of a director with similar characteristics.  
In order to highlight this relationship between influence and indispensability, we use a 
calculus algorithm that measures the influence of a director j on a director i taking 
betweenness centrality as a reference criterion. The stages of the algorithm are as follows: 
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o Calculation of the measures of betweenness centrality for the overall network 
o For each i reference director: 
 deletion of the links of director j;  
 calculation of the measures of betweenness centrality;  
 calculation of the matrix of positional variations: measure of the director’s 
impact j for i in absolute (change of the place in the general ranking), in 
relative (change of the weighted place by the distance from j compared to its 
initial ranking). 
If it can be assumed that the absolute place variations in a given classification allow for the 
measurement of the impact of an individual on another, it is more difficult to deduce from it a 
link with an indispensability criterion in the sense of Granovetter’s weak links (1973). 
Admittedly imperfect, due to the methodological difficulty of measuring the “strength of 
weak links”, the relative measure calculated by the algorithm is based on the following 
methodological hypotheses: 
- Hypothesis 1: an individual more influential than myself in the overall network cannot 
be a weak link for me11 ; 
- Hypothesis 2: an individual with little influence in the overall network is a weak link 
the “strength” of which is directly proportional to the gap between me and him/her.  
The indicators of j on i are calculated as follows: 
- If Bet(j,total) > Bet(i,total) : 
- In absolute: Inf(i,j) = Place variation = Bet(i,total)- Bet(i,total-{j}). 
- In relative: InfR(i,j) = Inf(i,j)*Log[Bet(j,total)- Bet(i,total)] 
- If Bet(j,total) > Bet(i,total) : Inf(i,j)=0 and InfR(i,j)=0. 
                                                 
11Admittedly, this hypothesis is flawed. Nothing allows for the exclusion in the sense of the strength of weak 
links of individuals better positioned than myself according to a given criterion. However, to be consistent with 
Milnor’s criterion of “row adjunction”, we wish to test to what measure the addition or the deletion of a lower 
placed individual can change my ranking.  
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With Bet(i,total) the ranking of director i within the overall network with regard to the 
criterion of betweenness centrality, and with Bet(i, total-{j}) that is this very ranking, but in 
the network without the links of director j, the relative value balances the absolute value in 
relation to the log deviation of the initial position between the two directors.  
We limited the calculations to the first 100 directors of the initial ranking (i.e. i such as 
Bet(i,total)<101). In fact, we are looking for directors who are potentially indispensable to the 
initially influential directors.  
It should be mentioned that the deletion of a j director’s links can have two types of influence 
on i: 
- a positive influence if Inf(i,j)>0: i.e. deleting the links of j will improve the position of 
i. For instance, the path from a 10th place to a 3rd place will give the value Inf(i,j)=7. 
In the same way, we will have InfR(i,j) >0. Consequently, i will do anything to keep j 
out, or, if the latter is already within the network, to exclude him.  
- a negative influence if Inf(i,j)<0 (and in fact InfR(i,j)<0): the deletion of j’s links will 
make i drop places within the rankings. Example: the path from a 3rd place to a 7th 
place gives Inf(i,j)=-7. In this case, i will do anything to keep j within the network or 
to have him join it.  
We suggest that the influences be calculated separately as well as overall12. The following 
tables (table 1 and 2) provide us with the top 20 most influential/indispensable (the first 100 
are provided in Appendix A, section A.4).  
 
Proposition 2: An influential individual is not indispensable unless he has an overall negative 
influence. If not, he is undesirable.  
                                                 
12
  The overall indicator is calculated for each j by squaring the sum of Inf(i,j) in relation to i. The 
“positive” (“negative”) only takes into account the “positive” (“negative”) sums of Inf(i,j). The same 
methodology applies to the relative indicators.  
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Starting with Table 1, before anything it is apparent that François Henrot or even Ernest-
Antoine Seillière are influential, but not indispensable. In fact, their absence benefits a certain 
number of directors, who recover places in the rankings. 
Bet(j,Total) Name Inf(pos) Bet(j,Total) Name Inf (neg) 
70 Henrot François 30 44 Ferrero Dominique -38 
79 Potier Benoît 30 28 
Seillière Ernest-
Antoine -37 
71 de Rudder Thierry 28 70 Henrot François -30 
59 Pinault François 28 79 Potier Benoît -30 
62 David François 26 71 de Rudder Thierry -28 
52 Lebègue Daniel 26 72 Desmarais Paul Jr -28 
53 Ricard Patrick 26 73 Lauvergeon Anne -28 
64 Arnault Bernard 25 59 Pinault François -28 
28 
Seillière Ernest-
Antoine 25 17 Dumas Jean-Louis -27 
96 Badin Jacques 24 52 Lebègue Daniel -27 
44 Ferrero Dominique 24 45 Seydoux Jérôme -27 
253 Halley Robert 24 62 David François -26 
299 
Leal-Maldonado José 
Luis 24 53 Ricard Patrick -26 
313 March Carlos 24 64 Arnault Bernard -25 
45 Seydoux Jérôme 24 47 
Chodron de Courcel 
Georges -25 
412 Vandelvede Luc 24 65 Rohatyn Félix G. -25 
54 Douroux Lucien 23 96 Badin Jacques -24 
58 
de La Martinière 
Gérard 20 253 Halley Robert -24 
75 Gallois Louis 20 299 
Leal-Maldonado José 
Luis -24 
80 Rodocanachi Pierre 20 313 March Carlos -24 
Table 1 - The 20 most influential according to the positive or negative absolute criterion 
 
Starting with Table 1, before anything it is apparent that François Henrot or even Ernest-
Antoine Seillière are influential, but not indispensable. In fact, their absence benefits a certain 
number of directors, who recover places in the rankings. Thus, Sylvia Jay (initially 69th, just 
ahead François Henrot 70th) would recover 9 places without François Henrot’s links. 
Obviously, in relative terms, François Henrot will not be the most easily influenced (in the 
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sense of weak links) as he is too close to Sylvia Jay. As far as Jacques Badin is concerned, 
who initially had the 96th place, hence further away from Sylvia Jay than François Henrot, he 
would drop 8 places in the rankings to Sylvia Jay if he were not there. From this, one can 
deduce that: a) François Henrot is the most influential at the overall network level and that, b) 
Jacques Badin is indispensable to Sylvia Jay, whereas François Henrot is undesirable. 
Relatively speaking, it is Jacques Badin who appears as the weak link that is most influential 
and indispensable to Sylvia Jay. However, while Jacques Badin is first from the point of view 
of his relative positive influence (table 2), his nuisance is relatively weak. At most, he makes 
Jean-Louis Beffa (initially 77th) drop 2 places, and the same to Robert Halley (initially 253th). 
Note that the latter makes François Henrot climb 8 places; he is his most 
influential/indispensable weak link. 
Bet(j,Total) Name  InfR(pos) Bet(j,Total) Name InfR(neg) 
96 Badin Jacques 143 96 Badin Jacques -142.25 
253 Halley Robert 130.51 253 Halley Robert -129.23 
299 
Leal-Maldonado 
José Luis 125.16 299 
Leal-Maldonado José 
Luis -123.54 
313 March Carlos 123.26 313 March Carlos -121.5 
79 Potier Benoît 114.86 123 Bisschoff Manfred -110.13 
123 Bisschoff Manfred 111.19 28 Seillière Ernest-Antoine -108.94 
70 Henrot François 108.33 79 Potier Benoît -105.79 
245 Grube Rüdiger 102.99 44 Ferrero Dominique -105.36 
412 Vandelvede Luc 102.3 245 Grube Rüdiger -101.32 
92 Arnault Jean 101.47 92 Arnault Jean -100.06 
93 Arnault Delphine 101.42 93 Arnault Delphine -100.02 
107 Bazire Nicolas 100.8 107 Bazire Nicolas -99.34 
114 
Belloni Lazard 
Antonio 100.48 114 Belloni Lazard Antonio -98.992 
117 Bernheim Antoine 100.34 117 Bernheim Antoine -98.84 
193 Della Valle Diego 96.388 412 Vandelvede Luc -97.861 
59 Pinault François 96.152 70 Henrot François -96.566 
99 Barberis Pierre 94.222 193 Della Valle Diego -94.466 
71 de Rudder Thierry 93.302 99 Barberis Pierre -93.909 
21 
 
243 Godé Pierre 93.171 133 Bouygues Madame -92.293 
133 Bouygues Madame 92.639 243 Godé Pierre -90.82 
Table 2 - The 20 most influential according to the relative criterion 
 
If we make the same calculations for all of the directors, we find that only 18 directors have 
no impact (positively or negatively) on the ranking of other directors. These directors all 
belong to the Arcelor Company. In fact, as shown in Figure 4 below, this company is initially 
isolated within the network by the fact that none of its directors has any links with a director 
of another company from CAC 40.  
 
 
Figure - Network of the companies within CAC 40 2004 
 
3.3. Where Are the Strong Links? 
We undertake to find the strong links according to two criteria. First of all, by using the 
previous algorithm and giving up hypothesis 1. We allow the taking into account of the 
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influence of individuals better placed than me according to a given criterion. Thereafter, we 
will use a community cohesion criterion.  
Starting with Table 3 (also see Appendix A.5), we finally notice very few changes to the initial 
betweenness centrality rankings with regard to the positive impact and no change with regard 
to the sum13.  
Bet(j,Total) Inf(Pos) 
Bet(j,Tota
l) Inf(Neg) Bet(j,Total) Inf(Pos)+Inf(Neg) 
1 
Owen-Jones 
Lindsay 1 
Owen-Jones 
Lindsay 1 Owen-Jones Lindsay 
2 Breton Thierry 21 Barbizet Patricia 2 Breton Thierry 
21 Barbizet Patricia 2 Breton Thierry 3 Mestrallet Gérard 
3 Mestrallet Gérard 10 Friedmann jacques 4 Proglio Henri 
10 
Friedmann 
jacques 3 Mestrallet Gérard 5 Bouton Daniel 
6 
de Royère 
Edouard 6 de Royère Edouard 6 de Royère Edouard 
9 Roger Bruno 22 Lagardère Arnaud 7 Pébereau Michel 
4 Proglio Henri 9 Roger Bruno 8 Lombard Didier 
5 Bouton Daniel 35 Gandois Jean 9 Roger Bruno 
7 Pébereau Michel 13 
Jeancourt-
Galignani Antoine 10 Friedmann jacques 
13 
Jeancourt-
Galignani Antoine 17 Dumas Jean-Louis 11 Carron René 
22 
Lagardère 
Arnaud 5 Bouton Daniel 12 Mayer Francis 
17 
Dumas Jean-
Louis 7 Pébereau Michel 13 
Jeancourt-Galignani 
Antoine 
11 Carron René 4 Proglio Henri 14 Fourtou Jean-René 
8 Lombard Didier 29 
Pineau-
Valencienne Didier 15 
Ladreit de 
Lacharrière Marc 
19 
Barbier de la 
Serre René 19 
Barbier de la Serre 
René 16 Desmarest Thierry 
16 
Desmarest 
Thierry 11 Carron René 17 Dumas Jean-Louis 
35 Gandois Jean 44 Ferrero Dominique 18 De Croisset Charles 
29 
Pineau-
Valencienne 
Didier 8 Lombard Didier 19 
Barbier de la Serre 
René 
24 Minc Alain 16 Desmarest Thierry 20 Riboud Franck 
Table 3 - The 20 most influential directors 
 
                                                 
13
  The measure of the betweenness centrality of i is in fact the sum over j of Inf(i,j), whatever j is.  
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We can see that Lindsay Owen-Jones is influential, but not indispensable to the other directors 
who, as it is case for almost half of them, would all go up one place if he left the network. The 
presence of Patricia Barbizet in 3rd place and 2nd place is worth mentioning. Moreover, she is 
the strongest non indispensable individual influence in the network. Without her links, 
François Henri Pinault would climb 35 places in the betweenness rankings. On the other hand, 
the strongest indispensable individual influence is that of Edouard de Royère (6th within the 
network). Without his links, Gérard de la Martinière (initially 58th) would drop 19 places.  
Of course, these results pertain to the applied efficiency criterion (here, the changes of 
position in the rankings of betweenness degree). As will become apparent, using a different 
criterion yields different results. Using the notions of cohesion and of communities, 
proposition 3 redefines the notion of indispensability. 
 
Proposition 3: The individuals indispensable to the network are those whose dismissal 
(respectively appointment) increases (diminishes) the number of communities.  
 
Proposition 3 succeeds remarks in connection to Figure 3 and to KPP-Neg. When deleting a 
director’s links takes away some cohesion via creating an additional community, then, indeed, 
that director was indispensable to the network. 
 
We are using the community research algorithm given by Blondel et al. (2008) to search for 
individuals. This algorithm14 provides us the size of communities (163; 118; 67; 63; 18)15 
after 2 cycles of clustering and (411; 18) after 3 cycles of clustering16. We then reuse the 
                                                 
14
 See Appendix B for a presentation. There are other detection algorithms, such as Pons’s WALKTRAP (2005) 
and Pons and Latapy (2006). 
15The  size 18 community consists of the directors of Arcelor. 
16
 After a first round, the algorithm provides 26 communities of respective sizes (31; 30; 30; 26; 25; 23; 19; 18; 
18; 17; 17; 17; 16; 15; 14; 14; 14; 13; 11; 11; 11; 8; 8; 8; 8; 7).  
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algorithm deleting all the links of a given individual each time. An individual non 
indispensable to the community, and therefore undesirable, needs to manage to lower by 1 the 
size of an existing community and to add to it one of size 1 (himself in relation with himself 
alone), for example (162; 118; 67; 63; 18: 1) and (410; 18; 1).  Focusing on the communities 
after 2 cycles of clustering, we note that deleting the links of 5 directors leads to the 
disappearance of the community. We are talking here about Gerhard Cromme, Yves Cannac, 
Michael Blakenham, Michel Bon et François Pinault17. It can be deduced that the 5 
individuals are indispensable to the non inclusion of their community in the network within 
another community. From the point of view of overall network cohesion, they are 
undesirable18. It should be noted that the deletion of the links of these individuals not only 
changes the number of communities and their respective sizes, but it also changes the internal 
makeup of the remaining communities. Thus, in the case of deleting Michel Bon’s links the 
third (i.e. his) community in size (67) is completely redistributed between the first 2 
communities (see Appendix B.5.). Similarly, 8 directors initially belonging to community 1 
switch to community 2. However, these changes are due to the fact that directors belong to ST 
Microelectronics, a company whose directors are relatively isolated within the network, 
excluding Didier Lombard. 
It should also be noted that deleting René Carron’s links strongly increases the second 
community, which goes from 118 to 143. Its connections switch from the penultimate 
community (initially size 63, size 37 afterwards) to the second. It should be noted as well that 
there are 97 directors who are more or less highly “indispensable”, in the sense of our 
proposition 3, to define communities after two clustering cycles (around 22.6 %). Finally, 
                                                 
17
 . See Appendix B.2. 
18
 A more selfish dynamic reading could tell us something different. They are indispensable, they are the trigger 
elements of a potential new dynamics in the construction of a community having as sole aim to compete with the 
old ones.  
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many directors influence the size of communities without, however, their being indispensable 
to the existence of the communities.  
After 3 cycles, communities are influenced by only 2 directors: Edouard de Royère Edouard 
and Didier Lombard. Without these, a certain number of directors (10, including Edouard de 
Royère, and 8, including Didier Lombard) find themselves isolated within a separate 
community from the main one. It will be noted that the two directors are not the most 
indispensable to the communities after two cycles. These potentially isolated directors are 
those of Sodexho-Alliance whose link with the rest of the network is Edouard de Royère and 
those of St Microelectronics who depend on Didier Lombard. 
 
Proposition 4: The individuals who are indispensable to small communities are not 
necessarily indispensable to big communities. 
 
Comparing the variations of communities after a clustering cycle, we note that if Edouard de 
Royère and Didier Lombard are indispensable to the cohesion of the large community 
detected after 3 cycles, their respective impact on the communities after one cycle is weaker, 
even negligible. Likewise, among the 11 directors indispensable for the existence of a 
community after a cycle, only two remain so after two cycles, namely Michel Bon and 
Michael Blakenham. Moreover, François Pinault and Yves Cannac, indispensable to the 
existence of a community after two cycles, have no impact on the size and number of 
communities after one cycle (Gap = 2).  
 
3.4. Comparison with the Network of Independent Directors of the CAC 40 
We know that within social networks, “power rings” are formed, connected, for instance, to 
qualitative criteria such as gender, studies, nationality or even occupation. This also applies to 
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the network of directors of the CAC 40. How do indispensability measures change when 
examined based on a qualitative subnetwork this time? 
From a “qualitative” point of view, among all of the directors that make up the Board of 
Directors of the CAC 40 companies, those who are declared independent appear particularly 
interesting to us. Historically, this notion of independence of directors appeared in the reports 
on corporate governance that flourished at the beginning of the 1990s in numerous countries 
following often fraudulent bankruptcies and financial scandals (Maxell, BCCI Bank) that 
certainly blamed company directors, but also the insufficient internal (Board of Directors) and 
external (auditors) control (Massol et al. (2009a)). These reports19, that were echoed by the 
“Principles of good governance” published by the OECD (2004), aimed to formulate 
recommendations designed to allow for a better control of the managers that were sometimes 
found to be more inclined to maximize their pension value than to act in the interest of the 
company as a legal entity.  
Within all “good conduct” preparations, that stipulate, amongst other things, the improvement 
in terms of transparency of information, the creation of special audit, appointment and 
remunerations committees, the presence of directors declared independent within the BOD 
holds a key place20. By virtue of their very presence, these directors are supposed to improve 
the functioning of the BOD, particularly by means of a better management of conflicts of 
interest between management and shareholders, but also between the shareholders 
themselves. Through their outsider perspective, their expertise and lack of links with various 
stakeholders within the company, they are meant to improve the reliability and the quality of 
                                                 
19As an example, we can cite: the Cadbury report in 1992 in the United Kingdom one of the first of its kind, and 
in France the reports Viénot I in 1995 and Viénot II in 1999, then the Bouton report in 2002. The various reports 
were then included in a unique document placed under the aegies of the AFEP (The Association of French 
Private Companies) and of the MEDEF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France – the largest union of employers 
in France), in 2003. In France, this document serves as “Code of Corporate Governance” and as a reference to 
companies.  
20To be considered independent, a director needs to fulfill a certain number of criteria which are detailed within 
the Bouton report or within the document of the AFEP – MEDEF that we have already cited. 
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the information provided to the market (investors who are already present or potential 
investors). Despite their shortcomings, analyses and external controls relying on information 
provided ultimately by the management are added value in terms of their extra reliability and 
rationality of policy, accounting or company resource management decisions.  
 
a) Comparative Statistics 
Based on the CAC 40 network of directors, we have created a related network: that of the 
directors who were declared independent at least once (ID) in the sense of the Bouton Report 
(2002). It is not easy to create a network of so-called independent directors. In fact, the same 
director can be declared independent within one company, but not be independent within 
another. Therefore we have considered the ID network in a broad sense: all directors who 
were declared to be independent at least once belong to this network. Table 1 compares the 
number of directorships.  
 
Number 
of  
director
ships 
1 2 2+ 3 3 et + 4 5 Total 
Number 
of 
Directo
rs 
CAC 40  
2004 ID 
108 
(63.53%) 
37 
(21.76%) 
62 
(36.47%) 
16 
(9.41%) 
25 
(14.71%) 
8 
(4.71%
) 
1 
(0.59%) 170 
CAC 40 
2004 
343 
(79.95%) 
58 
(13.52%) 
86 
(20.05%) 
18 
(4.20%) 
28 
(6.53%) 
9 
(2.10%
) 
1 
(0.23%) 429 
Table - Distribution of the number of directorships per director (in France, this number is 
limited to 5) 
 
Table 1 allows highlighting the following observations: 
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- There are only a few persons who hold several directorships (one or two as the 
case might be). Nevertheless, there continues to be a significant number of 
directors with three or more directorships (close to 6% for the CAC 40).  
- The network of so called “independent” directors seems to be more 
“concentrated”: the number of directors with several directorships is far more 
important than in the associated CAC40 network: more than 36% of the ID hold at 
least two directorships as opposed to 20% of directors in general. .  
Obviously, an ID type of network can be created within the CAC 40, a network that includes 
the most influential members of the CAC 40. The latter can always find at least one company 
within which they stand and which will provide them with an ID status. If we were to 
compare the directors declared independent at least once to those that were only declared 
independent, we will be able to conclude that the average number of directorships goes from 
1.55 to 1.14. In fact, the percentage of single directorships within the network of strict ID is 
more important than the “greater” ID network.  
 
b) Difference of Communities 
To return to the approach developed in section 2.3., we have measured the levels of influence 
of independent directors in their specific networks. As expected, this network engenders 
several small size communities. Thus, after a clustering cycle, the ID network consists of 24 
communities (of respective sizes: 9; 18; 17; 13; 11; 11; 10; 9; 8; 8; 8; 7; 7; 5; 5; 4; 3; 1; 1; 1; 
1; 1; 1; 1), after two cycles another 12 remain (57; 48; 33; 20; 5; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) and after 3 
cycles another 9 remain (158; 5; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1 ; 1). The first conclusion is that only 7 
directors have no link to other independent directors. This converges with the analysis 
detailed in the previous subsection.  
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Based on the table described in Appendix C.1., one can find that: the most influential 
independent directors of the network are not necessarily those who are the most influential in 
the network of independent directors. Whereas Michel Bon goes from 5th place to the 69 th and 
Gerhard Cromme from 1st place to the 12 th, Jacques Lagarde goes from the 282nd place to the 
6th at the same time. Naturally resulting from this is the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 5: An individual indispensable within the overall network is not necessarily so 
within his own qualitative network. 
 
Conclusion 
 
All in all, resorting to different instruments in the analysis of a network’s centrality engenders 
two types of difficulties: the need for almost perfect information and the possibility of an 
overall reading of a network. But, within a social network, each individual seeks, by 
definition, to establish his relative authority. If the appointment or the non renewal of a 
director does not escape this realization, the reasons of the co-opting member can be nuanced 
by the fact that his relative authority (micro perspective) depends on the ranking of his 
company/community within the overall network (macro perspective). Our micro perspective 
analyses lead us to the conclusion that a central individual is ultimately the one who most 
destabilizes the relative authority of others. We thus suggested an indicator of this influence 
and its possible variation in terms of indispensability or of non desirability. It was shown how 
this indicator, in relative terms, allows us to provide a measure of the strength of weak links. 
Moreover, this modified indicator (giving up on the hypothesis of a lower initial ranking) also 
provides a measure of indispensability from a macro perspective, as well as a community 
based approach. The limitations of this work are obvious, as illustrated by the difficulties of 
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the transition towards a qualitative network. Whatever the criterion applied, the notion of 
indispensability is in itself a function of the researched network and of the efficiency criterion 
applied; not to mention that efficiency can be an external a priori aspect of the network, such 
as the network’s ability to generate pricing agreements.  
Finally, an ongoing research endeavors to test the pertinence of an indispensability measure 
defined, for instance, on the basis of the betweenness criterion in order to understand the 
changes observed throughout a given period within Boards of Directors.  
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directors do not have the same importance, some being more influential than others. The centrality 
criteria seek to emphasize such types of “influence/importance” within the network.  
 
A.2. Degree Centrality Criterion 
 
This criterion consists of measuring the centrality of an individual by his number of connections to the 
others. An individual is central if he is connected to other members of the network, he is considered as 
marginal if he is only loosely connected to them. The higher the number of links attached to a node, 
the more central it will be considered. The centrality is thus an indicator of the implication and of the 
engagement of a node within the network. For our networks, this indicator corresponds to the number 
of links of a director within his network.  The following table provides the first 10 directors according 
to this criterion.  
 
1 Mestrallet Gérard 61 
2 Pébereau Michel 61 
3 Breton Thierry 58 
4 Proglio Henri 58 
5 Bouton Daniel 55 
6 Mayer Francis 54 
7 Owen-Jones Lindsay 53 
8 Carron René 51 
9 De Croisset Charles 50 
10 Fourtou Jean-René 47 
Table A. 2- Ranking of the first 10 premiers according to the criterion of degree centrality 
 
A.3. Betweenness Centrality Criterion  
 
This measuring unit, more precise than degree centrality, draws on the faculty of betweenness of an 
individual: it is the number of individuals/companies to which an individual/a company is indirectly 
connected, via his direct links. More specifically, this entails measuring the number of times a node is 
placed on the path between two other nodes that are not interlinked. An individual can be loosely 
connected to others and yet prove to be an indispensable intermediary for the exchanges. It is obvious 
that a high degree of betweenness is synonym with the ability to influence/co-ordinate the network. 
Within our networks, this indicator is also a measure of the likelihood of a director or of a company to 
be placed on a geodetic path (i.e. the smallest of path lengths connecting two nodes within a network) 
of different directors or companies of the network and so to be a mandatory path for connecting two 
directors or companies. 
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Name (Entire Newtork) B. score Name (without F. Riboud’s links) B. score 
Owen-Jones Lindsay 6584.3 Breton Thierry 6638.1 
Breton Thierry 6552.6 Owen-Jones Lindsay 6457.3 
Mestrallet Gérard 5360 Mestrallet Gérard 5477.5 
Proglio Henri 5190.7 Proglio Henri 5310.7 
Bouton Daniel 5180.5 Bouton Daniel 5215.8 
de Royère Edouard 4517.4 de Royère Edouard 4542.4 
Pébereau Michel 4368.7 Pébereau Michel 4458.1 
Lombard Didier 4127.8 Ladreit de Lacharrière Marc 4290.5 
Roger Bruno 4047.8 Roger Bruno 4243 
Friedmann jacques 3772 Lombard Didier 4145.5 
Carron René 3710.7 Mayer Francis 3806.3 
Mayer Francis 3646.9 Friedmann jacques 3788.7 
Jeancourt-Galignani Antoine 3142.1 Carron René 3778.5 
Fourtou Jean-René 3121 Jeancourt-Galignani Antoine 3157.6 
Ladreit de Lacharrière Marc 3043.3 Fourtou Jean-René 3144.3 
Desmarest Thierry 2999.9 Desmarest Thierry 3042.4 
Dumas Jean-Louis 2902.6 Barbier de la Serre René 2918.5 
De Croisset Charles 2842.8 De Croisset Charles 2768 
Barbier de la Serre René 2796.7 Lagardère Arnaud 2678.1 
Riboud Franck 2788.3 Dumas Jean-Louis 2666 
Table A. 3 - Changes in the betweenness centrality ranking without Franck Riboud’s links 
 
APPENDIX B – Evolution of Communities 
 
 
B.1. The Algorithm of Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte and Lefebvre (2008) 
 
 
This algorithm uses a cluster approach. Initially each node (director) forms a community by 
itself. Then, according to a maximization of the modularity gain criterion, a node i is 
potentially attached to the community of node j. These grouping cycles can be reiterated until 
a final criterion is reached, natural or to be defined (there is only one community left). Within 
our CAC 40 2004 database, after a grouping cycle, there were 26 communities left. After two 
cycles 5 communities remained, and after 3 cycles only 2 remained. 
 
B.2. Communities after 2 Cycles 
 
The table below classifies directors according to the importance of their impact on the 
communities. This importance is measured by the Gap variable, which is the squared sum of 
36 
 
the size gap between the communities without the links of that particular and the communities 
of the entire network (sizes in red) 21.  
 
NAME 163 118 67 63 18 0 GAP 
Cromme Gerhard 211 104 95 18 1 0 5309 
Cannac Yves 214 133 63 18 1 0 4867 
Blakenham Michael 207 141 62 18 1 0 4515 
Bon Michel 207 141 62 18 1 0 4515 
Pinault François 180 163 67 18 1 0 4339 
Blanc Christian 125 123 99 63 18 1 2493 
Henrot François 125 123 99 63 18 1 2493 
Leal-Maldonado José Luis 126 122 99 63 18 1 2409 
March Carlos 126 122 99 63 18 1 2409 
Rodocanachi Pierre 126 122 99 63 18 1 2409 
Vandelvede Luc 126 122 99 63 18 1 2409 
Breton Thierry 134 115 98 63 18 1 1811 
Azéma Jean 163 110 99 38 18 1 1713 
Bouton Daniel 163 110 99 38 18 1 1713 
Carron René 163 143 67 37 18 1 1301 
Ranque Denis 169 89 85 67 18 1 1217 
Lagardère Arnaud 162 91 87 70 18 1 1179 
Bisschoff Manfred 163 91 87 69 18 1 1165 
Arnault Bernard 163 92 87 68 18 1 1101 
Rohatyn Félix G. 163 92 87 68 18 1 1101 
Mestrallet Gérard 168 93 87 62 18 1 1051 
Chodron de Courcel Georges 163 94 86 67 18 1 953 
Douroux Lucien 163 94 86 67 18 1 953 
Fontanet Xavier 163 94 86 67 18 1 953 
Peyrelevade Jean 163 94 86 67 18 1 953 
Table B. 1 - First 20 directors based on the GAP criterion. 
 
B.3. Communities after 3 Cycles 
 
NAME 411 18 0 0 GAP 
de Royère Edouard 400 18 10 1 121 
Lombard Didier 402 18 8 1 81 
Table B. 3- Communities after 3 cycles 
                                                 
21
 In theory, it should be 2: (-1)^2 + (1)^2. 
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B.4. Communities after 1 Cycle 
 
We present here only the most “indispensable” 20 directors and 4 particular directors. 125 
directors out of 429 (29.13%) have a stronger impact on the structure of communities than the 
mere creation of an individual community.  
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B.5. Community Changes  
 
The table below highlights the way how communities evolved after Michel Bon’s links were 
deleted (each director is represented by a number between 1 and 429; Michel BON = 50). 
Initially, Michel Bon belonged to the 163 size community. In red, the community with Michel 
Bon in the network, in black the community without.  
 
163 207 118 141 67 0 63 62 18 18 0 1 
4 1 6 5 1  2 2 3 3 0 50 
5 4 7 6 11  40 40 80 80   
10 10 8 7 13  41 41 112 112   
12 11 9 8 22  43 43 113 113   
14 12 15 9 24  47 47 116 116   
17 13 16 15 26  51 51 152 152   
21 14 18 16 39  59 59 162 162   
23 17 19 18 48  66 66 201 201   
27 21 20 19 56  68 68 207 207   
28 22 25 20 61  77 77 210 210   
29 23 33 25 62  79 79 240 240   
30 24 34 26 72  91 91 277 277   
31 27 37 33 76  93 93 285 285   
32 28 38 34 85  95 95 286 286   
35 29 42 37 86  96 96 293 293   
36 30 44 38 89  98 99 318 318   
45 31 57 42 103  99 105 374 374   
46 32 58 44 106  105 107 418 418   
49 35 69 57 108  107 119     
50 36 70 58 124  119 123     
52 39 82 69 125  123 130     
53 45 83 70 128  130 134     
54 46 84 82 138  134 139     
55 48 88 83 140  139 151     
60 49 92 84 154  151 161     
63 52 97 88 155  161 174     
64 53 101 92 157  174 180     
65 54 102 97 159  180 188     
67 55 110 101 176  188 192     
71 56 111 102 183  192 193     
73 60 114 103 187  193 198     
74 61 118 106 209  198 202     
75 62 121 110 212  202 204     
78 63 131 111 221  204 216     
81 64 132 114 222  216 237     
87 65 133 118 226  237 251     
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APPENDIX C – Communities of Independent Directors 
 
Amongst the directors, we examine the network of directors that declared themselves as 
independent at least once. This network is compared to the network of non-independent 
directors. The following table gives the first 20 independent directors in terms of the GAP 
criterion defined in appendix B.2., and using communities after two cycles.  
 
Bet(I,Total)  
Entire 
network  
Bet(I,Total)  
Independent 
director  
network 
NAME  57 48 33 20 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 GAP 
12 1 Breton 
Thierry            
86 38 33 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1182 
21 2 Mestrallet 
Gérard           
78 33 26 20 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 716 
126 3 Bernheim 
Antoine           
76 48 33 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 602 
146 4 Brufau 
Antonio           
76 48 33 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 602 
192 5 Della Valle 
Diego            
76 48 33 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 602 
282 6 Lagarde 
Jacques          
76 48 33 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 602 
298 7 Lord Simon 
of Highbury     
76 48 33 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 602 
179 8 de La 
Garanderie 
Dominique      
73 49 35 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 502 
67 9 Friedmann 
jacques           
59 49 49 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 502 
304 10 Martre Henri   73 49 35 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 502 
379 11 Studer 
Robert            
73 49 35 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 502 
79 12 Joly Alain        71 48 38 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 462 
87 13 Ploix 
Hélène            
71 48 38 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 462 
135 14 Bouillot 
Isabelle           
72 33 32 20 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 452 
84 15 Mayer 
Francis           
72 48 33 5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 452 
23 16 Douroux 
Lucien             
64 48 45 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 434 
25 17 Peyrelevade 
Jean             
64 48 45 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 434 
102 18 Alphandéry 
Edmond          
66 48 43 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 422 
108 19 Barberis 
Pierre             
66 48 43 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 422 
280 20 Lachmann 
Henri              
66 58 33 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 422 
 
